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Introduction.
The last two decades have witnessed major changes in the organisation of health services in many countries, essentially because of financial crises arising from growing levels of demand and expectations and costs escalation. As regards the provision of hospital services, almost invariably the main change consisted in the introduction of prospective payment systems (PPS) that pay a fixed price per unit of output (price per case), in place of the traditional cost-reimbursement rules based on historical costing. By making hospitals the residual claimants for their costs PPS give strong incentives to economic efficiency, although this could be at the expenses of quality levels. The US introduced this system in 1983, along with a system of DRGs (diagnostic related groups) to classify cases and their costs and therefore define their prices. In Europe, the UK was one of the first countries to introduce this kind of reform with the White Paper Working for Patients in 1990 that introduced an internal market for hospital services. Even though the "quasimarket" system was subsequently eliminated, many of its key characteristics remained in place: the clear separation of purchasers (demand) and providers (supply) of hospital services, the independent hospital trusts, the use of contracts, or now "agreements", for the payment of their services via PPS. Other countries have then followed, and are following, along very similar lines, and the debate about different payment systems for hospital services is then on top of their political agendas.
This paper contributes to the literature on the properties of PPS by explicitly allowing for the existence of waiting lists. Building on a model originally developed by Chalkley and Malcomson (1998a) , waiting time is introduced as a measure of hospitals' demand taking into consideration the adverse effects that it has on patients utility, and therefore on social welfare. The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 identifies the framework of analysis and reviews the existing literature on the topic. Section 3 analyses more in detail the work of C&M: this is the basis for the waiting lists model developed in Section 4. Section 5 relaxes one of the assumptions of the model and analyses the case in which private and social costs are different. Conclusions are in Section 6. Appendix 1 discusses one particular extension to the main model.
The literature on PPS.
There is a very large literature on the incentive properties of different payment systems to hospitals, mainly but not exclusively from the US 1 . Its main characteristic is that of dealing with a multitask agency problem (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991) that is expressed in at least two potentially conflicting objectives: reducing the costs of the service without reducing the quality level. Cost reimbursement rules, that pay the hospitals on the basis of the costs they actually incurred, lack the incentives for cost reduction. On the other hand prospective payment systems make the hospital the residual claimant for its costs giving powerful incentives to reduce them (Laffont and Tirole, 1993) . However, this can lead to too low a quality level, as quality is costly but usually unmeasurable and unenforceable by contract. This is the key problem discussed by the literature. The superiority of PPS is acknowledged in all cases, although more complex forms of payment can be devised depending on the particular assumptions made, or characteristics considered: whether demand comes from privately insured patients, the degree of asymmetric information between purchasers and providers (about their costs and/or the quality level of the service), the heterogeneity of providers or patients, and so on.
A good general set up of the problem is given by Chalkley and Malcomson (1998a,b) . The model describes the contractual relationship between a self-interested provider that maximises its financial surplus, and a purchaser that maximises a social welfare function that depends on the number of cases treated and on the quality level of the treatment. The original demand for treatment comes from an exogenously given number of patients but the actual, final demand comes from the purchaser who buys hospital services for them. The purchaser is assumed to know the costs and to correctly perceive the quality level of hospital services. The model shows that a PPS that rewards hospitals on a price per case basis is not optimal, unless the system is demand constrained, because it leads to the treatment of too many patients; the first best solution is achieved by rewarding hospitals separately for the people they treat and for those who ask for treatment. The result holds true under different capacity constraints as well as when assuming different quality dimensions. If instead buyers do not infer quality correctly (1998b) only a second best solution can be achieved, by means of a mixed system that combines the fixed price per case to a partial cost reimbursement. Block contracts (simpler agreements that paid the hospitals a predefined amount of money in exchange for a total amount of services, very common in the first years of the UK reform) can be used only when assuming, following Newhouse (1970) , that hospitals are not profit-maximising units but have ethical concerns, and only if the system is demand-constrained.
More or less complicated prospective payment systems, that allow for different prices or for a cost reimbursement element, are also the solutions to the models of Ellis and McGuire (1986, 1991) , Ma (1994) , Rogerson (1994) , Ellis (1998) and De Fraja (2000) .
An issue that has not been given explicit consideration in the incentives' analysis of contracts is that of waiting time. In the contracting context, the existence of waiting lists has been usually considered as an indirect measure of quality, often to explain the demand for private insurance (Besley et al., 1999; Propper 2000) . As mentioned in the introduction, the aim of this paper is to contribute to the existing literature by extending the model of Chalkley and Malcomson (1998a) (C&M from now on) to the case in which an explicit role is given to the existence of waiting time; this will be considered as a measure of hospital demand, taking into consideration the adverse effects that it has on patients utility, and therefore on social welfare.
The C&M model.
The situation modelled by C&M is the definition of a contract between a purchaser of hospital services and a self-interested hospital. The purchaser buys the services for the patients, and it maximises a social welfare function. The hospital maximises a utility function that is increasing in its financial surplus. The contracting system and the determination of the purchaser's budget are taken as given, and no ethical or professional considerations enter the hospital's utility function.
The logic and the structure of the model can be summarised as follows. The two objective functions are identified and maximised with respect to the relevant variables, so that two sets of first order conditions (F.O.C.) are identified. As the hospital's utility function depends on the (kind of) payment it receives, the point is to choose a payment system that equates the two sets of F.O.C., so that the hospital makes a choice that maximises social welfare. This result is defined as a first best solution.
More in detail, define C(x,q,f) as the cost for the hospital of treating x patients at quality level q putting a level f of effort in cost reduction. C(x,q,f) is assumed to be increasing, convex in x and strictly convex in q. Utility for the hospital is given by U = s -v(x,q,f) where s is the financial surplus and v a disutility component 2 . Reservation utility for the hospital is v . Furthermore, the hospital receives a total payment B(.)
which can be made dependent on the number of cases x, on the demand y(q), which is assumed to be increasing in quality, or on costs depending on the contract chosen, but it cannot be directly a function of q. So for example with a simple price per case contract B = px; with cost reimbursement B=C(x,q,f); with partial cost sharing B = px + C, and so on. Thus hospital revenues can be affected by quality only via the effect that this has on demand.
From the above, the objective function that the hospital maximises can be identified as:
Define now b(x,q) as the benefit perceived by the purchaser of treating x patients with quality level q. This is increasing in both variables and strictly concave in q. The cost C(x,q,f) is assumed to be known to the purchaser, however q cannot be monitored and so cannot be enforced by contract. The total cost to the purchaser is the amount paid to the hospital, which can be re-specified as
The social welfare function will be the sum of the total benefits (to the purchaser and to the hospital) minus the total costs and it can now be written as 3 :
where >0 is to allow for distortions from raising revenue from taxation. The purchaser is maximising (2) subject to the constraint
Rearranging (2) and observing that it is a decreasing function of s, so that (3) will always hold as an equality, the social welfare function can now be rewritten as
The model consists of maximising (1) and (4) with respect to x, q and f under the further constraint that
is the maximum number of patients that can be treated by a hospital and is given by
that is the minimum value of demand y(q) and the capacity (maximum possible supply) of the hospital, k.
If (4) subject to (5) is maximised at x * , q * and f * , the problem is to find the payment system B(.) that maximises (1) subject to (5) at exactly the same values.
3 For simplicity this is specified for the single hospital case because all hospitals are assumed to be perfectly identical. The same results are obtained when allowing for several hospitals.
As mentioned in the introduction, the model shows that a PPS that pays hospitals on a price per case basis is optimal only if the system is demand constrained, whereas in all other cases a first best solution is reached by rewarding hospitals separately for the people they treat and for those who ask for treatment.
The waiting lists model.
One of the key assumptions in C&M model is that of demand observability; this is strictly linked with the discussion of the role of waiting lists, which are considered below. The assumption of demand's responsiveness to quality is less critical when demand does not come directly from patients but is filtered by medical professionals, who are in a better position to collect and process information about the quality of treatment provided by different hospitals. This is equivalent to considering health care as a search good and not an experience good (as it is for the single patient), thus avoiding much of the informational problems that are typical of the sector.
The main change brought to the C&M model is the explicit consideration of waiting lists, an increasingly hot issue in most systems. These are considered as a measure of patients' demand, and thus an indirect measure of quality, taking into consideration that they negatively affect patients' utility. The model is constructed as follows.
If patients get treatment of quality q, their utility from this treatment can be defined as (8) U = q If treatment is postponed by w periods, where w is the time length of the waiting list, then (8) must allow for a discounting factor reflecting time preference, and for a factor reflecting the risk of a worsening of patients conditions while waiting.
Define r the time preference factor and h the conditional probability of "dying" at time t, having survived until then 4 , the expected utility of a patient is (9) U = qe
Now define g as the number of people in front of a patient in the queue; its change over time will be given by 4 In particular, F(t) is the probability distribution function of dying at any point in time; e -ht = 1 -F(t) is the probability of surviving t periods, and so
is the conditional probability.
(10)
where x is the number of cases treated. Considering a steady state situation in which x (and later y, the demand) is constant, then (10) can be solved to obtain
Equation (11) means that the number of people in front of a person in the queue is a function of G (the number of people at the beginning, when t = 0) and it decreases with time, partly because they are treated partly because they die. When t = w then g(t) = 0 and (11) can be solved with respect to w, i.e. (15) is an expression of the expected utility of joining a queue at hospital i, and in equilibrium this value will be the same for every hospital.
In the social welfare function, the benefit is the expected utility of a cohort of patients asking for treatment at all hospitals at time 0; hospitals' costs are discounted by a factor e -rw = (x/y) r/h as they will be incurred only after w periods. The same discount rate r is assumed for both patients and hospitals, but this assumption can be easily relaxed.
The social welfare function can be now written as
In this case v is the present value of the hospitals' reservation utility.
On the hospitals' side, the objective function is like in C&M but with the cost-discounting factor. The demand function y(x,q) for each hospital is derived from (15) where U is the level of utility available at other hospitals.
Substituting (17) into the discount factor formula finally gives
which is the hospitals' objective function. Following on C&M results, in (18) the payment system B(.) has been directly specified as a function of the number of cases treated and the volume of demand (the proof of the non-optimality of other payment schemes is redundant and therefore not included).
The simultaneous maximisation of (16) and (18) with respect to x, q and f leads to the following system of F.O.C. To proceed (19) is equated with (22), (20) with (23) and (21) 
with (24).
First of all, (21) and (24) will always be the same, that is hospitals have an incentive to maximise the effort in cost reduction, i.e. with a prospective payment system they will always choose f*. As regards the choice of x and q, solving with respect to the price variables leads to
As could be expected, the optimal price, and hence the marginal benefit for the hospital, equals the marginal social benefit, net of a portion of the marginal cost. This result indicates that it is optimal to pay the hospital a fixed sum T and then a fixed price for every person asking for treatment by entering its waiting list, and a zero price for the number of people actually treated.
This apparently counterintuitive result stems from the way demand was modelled. On the one hand, hospitals have an incentive to increase the quality level of their service: they are paid on the basis of their demand and, given the assumptions, a higher quality attracts more people. On the other hand, however, more people demanding treatment translate into a longer waiting time, and this in turn acts negatively on demand. In order to counteract this effect hospitals will decide the number of people they want to treat, as the more patients are treated the shorter is the waiting time. In other words the adjustment towards equilibrium can be described as an adjustment towards an optimal waiting time; rewarding hospitals on the basis of their demand gives them immediate and direct incentives over q and also indirect incentives over x. Also, in the presence of (increasingly popular) waiting time targets this could counterbalance the potential incentive to find ways to exclude new or current patients from the queue, giving them the funding in advance to treat them. As shown more in detail in Appendix 1, if only a price per case were paid only a second best solution could be achieved, in which a lower quality level is traded off with a higher number of treatments. For example hospitals could reduce the length of stay and move towards a "quick" treatment of patients on a day basis, not a totally unfamiliar scenario in reformed systems.
The first best solution can be achieved also when allowing for hospitals and patients to have different discount factors for time preference, and when modelling the market as an oligopoly; in both cases the only difference is the price level, which is higher the more patients dislike being in a queue, or the fewer providers are on the market 5 .
A different result is instead obtained when relaxing the implicit assumption that social and private costs are the same and the "cost of the loss" of patients getting worse or dying while waiting is introduced in the social costs. This is explored in the next section.
The social "cost of the loss".
So far, the only costs that have been considered are the "production" costs of the hospital and its disutility. It is realistic however to consider that, from a social welfare point of view, the fact that people might get worse while they wait and eventually die has a cost, other than their own cost from waiting. In other words, not only people, but also society, are worse off the longer they have to wait; the events of getting worse and eventually dying carry a cost, that includes rather unmeasurable as well as more measurable elements (for example the payment of benefits to people when they cannot work). Call this "cost of the loss" . This has to be introduced in the social welfare function that the purchaser is assumed to be maximising. This means that social and private costs are now different.
The cumulative distribution of the probability of dying at time t is
If is the social cost of the loss, the expected social cost today of having y persons getting worse between now and w is given by (25), but in this case a positive price per case (B x ) is required, which is equal to the social cost of the loss itself.
To interpret this result it is necessary to analyse what effect the introduction of has had on the equilibrium. To do so, let's consider the following equations from the F.O.C. for welfare maximisation:
The effect that the introduction of has had on the optimal values of x and q can be calculated by totally differentiating (31) and (32), which results in
In matrix notation this can be rewritten as (35)
where H is the Hessian matrix of the second order derivatives of the welfare function. From (35) finally get
From the second order conditions the determinant of the Hessian matrix is known to be positive, so that
This means that the introduction of always produces an increase in the number of patients to treat, whereas the effect on the quality level depends on the size of the cross derivative of the hospital cost and disutility function. To shed more light on the above, consider the cross derivative W qx as calculated from (32); it can be seen that when (38) is true then an increase in the number of cases makes an improvement in quality more valuable to society. The increase in the optimal number of cases brought about by will therefore lead to a higher level of quality. The opposite holds in the case when (39) is true. Another way of looking at this is via the behaviour of the average cost function. From the convexity assumptions of the total cost function made at the beginning, the average cost per case (C+v)/x is an increasing function of both x and q, that is the average cost of treating a patient gets higher the more patients are treated and/or the higher is the quality level.
The implication of (38) is that the average cost will tend to increase with quality less when the hospital treats more people. If instead (39) is true then the increase in the average cost per case will be higher the more patients are treated. In the first case, a social welfare function that includes the cost of the loss will be maximised by increasing both quantity and quality; in the second the increase in the optimal number of cases will lower the socially optimal quality level.
Even if this last hypothesis might seem more reasonable, the opposite cannot be ruled out a priori. This could be the case for example if in order to increase the number of patients treated the hospital purchases particular equipment, or hires specialised staff with beneficial effects on quality, that can be increased at a lower extra cost.
In conclusion, the social cost of the loss introduces a difference between the social and the private cost functions, increasing the optimal number of cases so that a positive price per case is now required. The optimal price per entry in the waiting list is determined in the same way as before, and its value will depend on whether the optimal quality level has increased or decreased.
Conclusions.
This paper has analysed the structure of a prospective payment system to hospitals taking explicitly into account the existence of waiting lists. Building on a paper by C&M, waiting time has been modelled as adversely affecting patients' utility. The model shows that rewarding hospitals for their demand, as opposed to their output, leads to a first best solution. The additional payment of a price per case is instead required when the social cost of waiting is introduced alongside the private costs. In both cases the payment of a positive price for every person entering the queue is essential: the equilibrium is reached via the direct incentive that this gives towards quality, in order to attract demand. The incentive to optimal quantity comes from the need to reduce the average waiting time that arises from a higher demand but at the same time negatively affects it.
As will be detailed in Appendix 1, the payment of a price per case leads instead to a second best solution, in which a lower quality could be traded off with a higher quantity. Hospitals could for example reduce the average length of stay (lower quality level) and/or move towards the treatment of patients on a daybasis (Ferrari, 2005 ) which could in turn increase the probability of being readmitted, and therefore possibly increase the average waiting time. This scenario is actually not totally unfamiliar to the reformed English NHS with the additional risk of hospitals hiding true information about the real length of their waiting lists when specific targets about these are imposed. The payment of a price per demand might reduce the extent of this last problem but its proper discussion goes beyond the aim of this paper, as it involves other issues, such as the determination of the purchaser's budget, or the quality of their information. The paper is subject to other limitations, among which the assumption of perfect quality observability by purchasers, the modelling of quality as a onedimensional variable, or the exclusion of the probability of readmission; all these are acknowledged and the extensions left to future research. This appendix analyses the case in which the hospital is paid a positive price per case, B x , and no price per person entering their queue, i.e. no price per demand B y .
The F.O.C from the maximisation of (16) and (18) ( 1 to ensure that hospitals choose the optimal value of (C x +v x ). This does not guarantee that they will also choose x=x*, or that indeed it is optimal that they do so. In fact, now no instrument exists to give hospitals direct incentives to the right level of quality, as the comparison of (A.2) and (A.5) shows. As the cost function is strictly convex in q, hospitals will therefore choose q H <q*. Having no direct control over it, the purchaser will take this lower level of quality as given. The effect that this sub-optimal quality level has on the welfare function and on the final equilibrium can be seen by totally differentiating (A.1) that gives dW x = W xq dq + W xx dx so that dx/dq = -W xq /W xx Concavity of the welfare function means that W xx <0. For simmetry in cross derivatives from (A.2) one gets W xq = 1-(1+ ) C xq which will be positive or negative depending on the sign and size of C xq . If C xq >0 (as one might expect) and C xq > 1/(1+ ) then W xq <0, which implies dx/dq<0. In other words, the reduction in the quality level can lead to an increase in the optimal quantity level, i.e. the one that re-maximises the social welfare function.
This second best solution can now be achieved by setting the (new) optimal price per case as usual. CHALKLEY, M. and MALCOMSON, M.J. (1998c) . Government purchasing of
